Conceptualizing Willingness to Defend and to Fight for Own Country by Andžāns, Māris
14
Conceptualizing Willingness to Defend 
and to Fight for Own Country1
Dr. Māris Andžāns (ORCID: 0000-0002-4695-3929), 
Rīga Stradiņš University and Latvian Institute of International Affairs 
https://doi.org/10.25143/willingness_to_defend_2021_ISBN_9789934563997_14-17
Willingness to fight war(fare), willingness to fi  gh t fo  r ow  n co  un try 
and willingness to defend one’s own country has been the subject to 
various academic studies. The issue has been approached from different 
perspectives, though usually relying on the interpretation of quantitative 
data acquired via public polls. 
The most comprehensive research in this field has been conducted by 
Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel, as summarized in their article of 2015. The 
article presents four hypotheses. First, in a cross-sectional aspect, societies 
with higher life opportunities and existential security level emphasize pro-
choice values and thus demonstrate lower willingness to risk their lives in 
wars. Second, in a longitudinal aspect, the stronger growth in pro-choice 
values, the sharper the decline in willingness to endanger their lives. 
Third, in a multi-level aspect, societies with more common pro-choice 
values inflict members of those societies with lower levels of willingness 
to imperil themselves. Fourth, in a historical aspect, humiliation in past 
wars decreases the willingness to fight. All in all, the authors argued that 
increased life opportunities contribute to higher valuation of lives and, 
accordingly, lead to a lower willingness to risk lives.2 
Several other hypotheses deserve attention as well. Díez-Nicolás 
concluded that the level of national pride, as well as the level of confidence 
in national armed forces is the most accurate prognosticator for the 
willingness to fight for own country  —  the higher the national pride and 
confidence in national armed forces, the higher the willingness to fi gh t 
for the country. According to him, this trend can be observed in countries 
with significant d i fferences, an d it  te nds to  be  st able ov er lo ng pe riods of  
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time.3 Also, Puranen and Torgler have underlined the strong link between 
higher level of national pride and trust in armed forces, and the willingness 
to fight. Torgler also added the trust in governments and legal systems as 
indicators of higher levels.4 
Several studies have noted that the willingness to fight for one’s 
country significantly depends on the historical, social and political context. 
Previous research, also that of Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel, has found 
two groups of countries standing out amongst others — the World War Two 
Axis powers (Germany and Japan in particular) and the Nordic countries. 
In the former, willingness to fight is low,5 while in the latter it surpasses 
the predictions of other hypotheses and indicators.6 Inglehart, Puranen and 
Welzel (and Puranen in a separate article) have explained these findings 
with the lifestyles of the Nordics and the vicinity of Russia which results 
in associating defence of a state with defence and promotion of values.7 
Similarly, Díez-Nicolás observed that entanglement in ongoing conflicts and 
external threats can raise the level of willingness.8
Studies have also assessed regional, cultural and socio-economic contexts 
as determinants. Díez Nicolás concluded that the highest willingness to 
fight can be observed in Asian Sino-Confucian, Islamic and Sub-Saharan 
countries, while the lowest in West European Catholic and Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Baltic states here were classified among West European Protestant 
countries).9 A WIN/Gallup International Global Survey from 2014 concluded 
that the highest willingness to fight for one’s country is in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa, as well as in Asia (also among Muslims and Hindus 
in terms of religious affiliation), whereas it is the lowest in Western Europe 
and North America (also among Protestants).10 Furthermore, Anderson, 
Getmansky, and Hirsch-Hoefler concluded that in societies with higher 
income inequality the willingness to fight for one’s own country is lower 
compared to those with lower inequality levels.11
Among research focusing on choices of individuals, it has often been 
observed that indicators such as gender and attitude towards the country 
are notable factors. While various studies tend to arrive at different 
conclusions on certain indicators, many have concluded that men are more 
likely to fight than women12 (some others note also a younger age13 and 
marital status14), as well as that individuals with higher national pride and 
trust in the armed forces are willing to fight15 (some also note the related 
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trust in the government and legal system, as well as religiousness and 
ideological inclination towards the right).16 While the level of education has 
been discussed as a factor, Anderson, Getmansky, and Hirsch-Hoefler noted 
a lack of evidence for interrelationship between education of individuals and 
willingness to fight for country.17 
Other literature has assessed the impact of socio-economic factors 
on individual’s choices. Anderson and Hirsch-Hoefler18 and Anderson, 
Getmansky, and Hirsch-Hoefler evaluated the link between economic 
equality and willingness to fight. The latter research concluded that in 
societies with low levels of inequality there is no difference in willingness to 
fight among the rich and the poor. However, as inequality in society grows, 
rich people become less willing to fight compared to their poor counterparts 
(poorer individuals are more prone to mobilize to fight).19 Torgler assessed 
the impact of divergence between benefits and costs in willingness to go to 
war. He did not find sufficient evidence that calculation between benefits 
and costs significantly influences the choice of individuals.20
Finally, Horowitz and Levendusky in an experiment in the United States 
assessed the impact of conscription in supporting warfare. They concluded 
that mandatory service reduces public support for wars. The most likely 
explanation is self-interest of individuals, i.e., preference not to risk their 
own life as conscripts.21 
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